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1.  Introduction 
The relationship between inequality and economic growth has been subject to considerable 
debate in development circles. Following the seminal work of Kuznets (1955), a growing 
empirical literature addresses the linkages between income inequality and economic 
growth. While most studies consider inequality detrimental for growth, some recent 
findings point towards a possible positive relationship. Such differences are strongly 
determined by the type of indicators and the estimation procedures that are used. 
Almost all studies that explore the relationship between inequality and growth rely 
on measures of income inequality rather than asset distribution as an explanatory variable. 
This is troublesome since the theoretical relationship between inequality and growth is 
better explained by assets distribution than by income. Inequality in assets is likely to 
reduce growth prospects due to insecure property rights or social polarization that reduce 
investment prospects. Asset redistribution in the form of land or education reforms can also 
play an important role in improving growth performance. For policy purposes, it makes a 
large difference whether inequality of income or inequality of assets is the underlying 
factor of registered differences in economic growth. 
Most current studies rely on cross-sectional evidence rather than on panel data 
analysis and may thus provide biased results. The results obtained from this data can hardly 
be considered as adequate structural estimates, given the presence of country-specific 
attributes such as initial factor endowments or the country’s particular history. Moreover, 
when panel data have been used to test the relationship between income inequality and 
growth, it sometimes show the disappearance of the traditional negative effect, thus giving 
  1policy makers an argument to focus on growth-enhancing policies without worrying about 
distributional issues.  
  This article provides a theoretical discussion and some novel empirical tests to 
understand the relationships between assets distribution and economic growth. We explore 
the channels through which these processes are linked, paying particular attention to the role 
of human capital. In addition to traditional approaches that refer to credit market 
imperfections and investment constraints, we incorporate some new arguments that link 
inequality of assets with delayed growth trough weak property rights institutions.   
  In order to avoid the methodological problems stated before, we assembled a new 
panel database that includes observations for more than 30 countries over the last three 
decades. The data include a time-varying variable for the Land Gini index over this period 
that will enable us to overcome the limitations of previous studies that included only a 
time-invariant measurement. A system GMM estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) is used to generate truly unbiased and consistent regression estimates. 
The article is structured as follows. First we present a review of the different 
theoretical models that explain the implications of asset inequality for economic growth. 
Hereafter, we outline the econometric estimation procedure. Next, we present the results of 
our estimation. We conclude with some implications for policy and further research. 
2.  Inequality and Growth 
The recent literature on the relationship between inequality and growth distinguishes two 
broad types of approaches that focus on particular channels through which these processes 
are linked. Following Dominicis et al. (2005) we refer to these approaches as the ‘political 
economy’ models and the ‘socio-political instability’ models. In political economy models, 
inequality affects taxation through the political process by which individuals can choose the 
  2tax rate directly or via electing governments with certain redistributive policies (Alesina 
and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994). If inequality determines the extent of 
redistribution, it will then have an indirect effect on the economy’s rate of growth. In very 
unequal societies we would expect then that more voters will prefer larger redistribution. If 
redistribution reduces the incentives to invest, and hence the growth rate, it is to expect then 
that more equal societies will grow faster.
1  
  More extended political economy models with capital market imperfections include 
credit constraints that prevent the poor from undertaking profitable investments. A more 
egalitarian wealth distribution can help to overcome asset thresholds and might result in 
higher aggregate investment in physical or human capital. As Stiglitz (1969) pointed out, 
when there are decreasing returns to capital and capital markets are imperfect, aggregate 
level of output may be affected by the wealth distribution. Aghion et al. (1999) used an 
endogenous growth model where redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor (whose 
marginal productivity of investment is relatively high) increases aggregate productivity and 
therefore growth. Under such conditions, asset redistribution creates investment opportuni-
ties in the absence of well-functioning capital markets, which in turn will enhance 
aggregate productivity and growth.  
  Socio-political instability approaches devote more attention to the role of social 
stability and property rights. Through its impact on economic efficiency, the distribution of 
assets can affect the cost of market exchange, the incentives to invest, the levels of 
violence, and the societies’ ability to respond to exogenous shocks (Deininger and Olinto 
                                                 
1 Although these models account for the negative correlation between inequality and growth, some empirical 
studies found a positive rather than a negative effect of redistribution on growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). 
When redistribution measures such as the tax rate or the level of social spending are regressed on measures of 
inequality, the coefficients are either insignificant or have a sign opposite to what theory predicts (Perotti 
1996; Lindert 1996). 
  31999). Inequality can also create barriers that affect the cost of social interaction and 
economic exchange (Collier 1998; Temple 1998). Finally, inequality can be associated with 
violence and crime which will affect growth through the direct damage, the need to spend 
resources on preventive measures, and the impact on property rights and investment 
incentives (Bourguignon 1998, Knaack and Keefer 1995).  
    In a recent study, Keefer and Knack (2002) argue that social polarization – 
measured by the inequality on land holdings – affects the likelihood of extreme policy 
deviations, making property rights less secure and thus negatively affecting growth. Once 
controlling for this indirect effect of inequality on growth, the direct link is likely to 
diminish. In a similar vein it can be argued that not only inequality of assets can create a 
negative impact in growth, but also the degree of tenure security over those assets and the 
property right system in a country will influence investments and growth. Studies that 
address the relationship between institutions and growth (Rodrik, 2000) argue that secure 
and stable property rights are a key incentive to invest.
2 A clear specification of land rights 
play also a crucial role in correcting financial market imperfections, given their collateral 
function.
3 Moreover, securing land property rights will be a key to reduce transaction cost 
in factor markets and thus improve economic efficiency and economic growth (Lipton 
1974, Deininger et al. 2003; Byamugisha, 1999). 
Most studies that analyze the systematic relationship between inequality and growth are 
based on rather simple measures of income inequality. Using cross-country data they find a 
negative relationship between income inequality and growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994). When a variable for initial land inequality is included it is 
                                                 
2 The World Bank report by Deininger and Binswanger (1999) provides a comprehensive summary. 
3 Various studies have found that although land titles are a necessary condition they are not sufficient for 
getting access to (formal sources of) credit. See for example Boucher et al. (2004) and Van Tassel (2004). 
  4negatively associated to growth. An important extension to these approaches would be to 
examine the dynamic relationship between changes in asset distribution and economic growth. 
Recently, new and larger data sets have become available that allow the 
incorporation of more sophisticated panel techniques. Studies by Forbes (1998) and Li and 
Zou (1998) using fixed-effects estimators to control for country-specific characteristics and 
dynamic GMM estimators to correct for endogeneity suggest that the negative relationship 
between inequality and growth weakens considerably and may actually be reversed.
4  
  Various studies reviewed the consistency of these results using different specifica-
tions of income inequality (Gini coefficients, quintile shares, income ratios), different 
country samples and time periods
5. Dominicis et al. (2005) used meta-analysis procedures 
to review existing evidence from 21 studies and conclude that inequality affects growth in a 
different way in higher and less developed countries.  
A number of these recent contributions examine the possibility that - in line with the 
theoretical models discussed above - it is less inequality of income but unequal distribution 
of assets that may cause the reduction in countries’ growth rates (Deininger and Squire 
1998; Birdsall and Londoño 1998; Keefer and Knack 2002). However, empirical evidence 
has been largely based on cross-sectional country level data rather than panel data analysis. 
Due to differences in the variables used (income vs. assets distribution) or the methods 
applied (cross-section vs. panel data), the empirical literature showed ambiguous predic-
tions regarding the possible impact of inequality on growth.  
                                                 
4 Such positive effects of inequality on growth might be explained by the higher savings amongst rich 
households and the possibilities to overcome sunk costs in large investment projects. 
5 Galor and Moav (2004) provide evidence that the distribution-growth relationship depends on the 
development stage of a country, with more inequality at early stages of industrialization and more equality 
after people start to invest in education. 
  5The study conducted by Deininger and Olinto (1999) is an attempt to overcome 
these limitations by putting together a comprehensive panel data set with asset inequality 
between countries. They use a GMM estimator approach to examine the robustness of the 
income-growth relationship, including Gini coefficients to account for the initial land 
distribution (for the period 1960-70). This study not only identifies a significant negative 
impact of income and asset inequality on growth rates, but also analyzes some of the 
channels through which this effect takes place.  
  We further explore what we consider two critical limitations of the former analysis. 
The first one is related to the use of a proper database, while the second one deals with 
potential gaps in the theoretical approach. While Deininger and Olinto (1999) recognize that 
inequality of assets is likely to be more stable inter-temporally than the distribution of 
income, they implicitly assume that asset distribution remains unchanged over a long time 
period. Moreover, it is less appropriate to use a time-invariant land Gini coefficient for the 
1960-70 period as main variable, since many countries made important land distribution 
reforms precisely right after that decade.
6 The collection of new information about land Gini 
distribution for several countries and different time periods allows us to analyze how changes 
in this variable - and not only their initial level – affect the relationship with growth. 
  The theoretical gap mentioned above refers to the weak explanations that are 
usually offered regarding the potential direct effects of assets inequality on growth, 
controlling for the investment effect. It is argued that what could be behind this finding is 
either an “incentive effect” or a “social capital” effect, whereby inequality would increase 
the cost of social and economic interaction, including the ability to maintain rule of the law 
                                                 
6 This is the case for example in many Latin American countries that present the most unequal distribution of 
land in the sample used for the Deininger & Olinto study. 
  
  6in an unbiased way. Following this argument, and in line with the recently forwarded 
theoretical arguments regarding the linkages between property rights, inequality of assets, 
and growth, we need to test if - once controlling for the stability of property rights in each 
of the countries - the direct effect of assets inequality on growth is still maintained. 
3.  Econometric Estimation and Data Specification 
We start from the usual equation in the empirical analyses of the determinants of growth: 
(1)   it i it i it it Z X y y ε δ β α + + + = − − − − ' ' y ) ( 1 1 t 1  
where yit denotes the logarithm of per-capita GDP of country i in period t, Xit-1 is a vector 
of country-specific time-varying variables affecting growth, and Zi is a vector of country 
specific time-invariant variables, and εit is an error term that captures the effect of time-
invariant and time-varying unobserved country characteristics. The disturbance term εit can 
be divided in a country-specific time-invariant effect ui and the time-variant disturbance eit. 
We assume that Cov(eit, ui)=0 and Cov(eit, eis)=0, for any t ≠ s. Eq. (1) becomes then:  
(2)   it i i it i it it e u Z X y y + + + + = − − − − ' ' y ) ( 1 1 t 1 δ β α  
The OLS estimation of the parameters in equation (2) is likely to be biased and inconsistent 
for two reasons: First, by construction yit-1 is correlated with the country-specific effect ui, 
and second, it is likely that some of the variables in vectors Xit-1 and Zi are also correlated 
with that error component. Second, asset inequality can be correlated to factor endowment, 
and conditioned by the country-specific history which are unobservable characteristics 
measured by ui.  
The usual solution to this lack of orthogonality with panel data is to estimate the 
specified parameters by applying OLS to the “within groups” transformation, or “first 
differencing” left and right-hand-side variables in (2). In this particular case, however, 
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the dynamic nature of the model, the first difference of yit-1, defined as ∆yit-1 = yit-1 - yit-2 is 
by construction correlated to the first difference of the error component eit, given by ∆eit= 
eit - eit-1. Second, even though Xit-1 is uncorrelated by assumption to the error component eit, 
Xit is likely to be contemporaneously correlated to eit, which implies that ∆Xit-1 will be 
correlated to ∆eit. Therefore, the OLS estimator of α and β obtained by regressing ∆yit on 
∆yit-1 and ∆Xit-1 will be biased and inconsistent. Since the first difference of Zi is zero, we 
would not be able to identify their parameters using fixed effect estimation methods.  
The lack of identification for the time-invariant variables when the within transfor-
mation is adopted can be solved by employing the IV estimator proposed by Hausman and 
Taylor (1981). For the lack of orthogonality between ∆yit-1,  ∆Xit-1 and ∆eit, inherent to 
dynamic panel data models, Arellano and Bond (1991) formulate a consistent and unbiased 
GMM estimator which uses twice lagged yit and Xit as instruments. An extension of this 
model proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) provides a unifying GMM framework that 
can be generalized for the estimation of Hausman and Taylor type models, as well as 
dynamic panel data models. In addition of using instruments in levels for the equations in 
first differences, we also use instruments in first differences for the equation in levels, which 
allow us to estimate a “system GMM” instead of only a “differences GMM” model as the 
one proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). With this addition we can estimate the 
parameters in the levels equation that explain a substantial part of the total variation in the 
data. 
We composed a new data set on the distribution of operational holdings of 
agricultural land from the decennial FAO World Census of Agriculture and other sources 
for 35 countries. For each country, this information has been recovered for three different 
  8periods over time: 1960-1970, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990, giving us a total of 105 
observations in the panel. We complement the data with measures of real GDP per capita 
and the share of investment in GDP from the Penn-Word data set, data on human capital 
stock taken from Barro and Lee (2000), and finally a time-invariant variable containing a 
measurement of the “rule of law” for the 1980 decade taken from the ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide) law and order rating.
7
The panel data (see Annex 1) show that land Gini coefficients do not only vary 
across countries but also show considerable change over the studied time period. For 
example, the average Gini coefficient for the initial period is 0.6 and for the final period 
0.62, both with standard deviations of 0.16. The average difference between the Gini of the 
initial period for all countries and that of the final period is 0.015 (standard deviation 0.06).  
4.  Results 
The growth regression results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 for different specifications of 
the equation. As we can observe in column 1, the coefficient for the land Gini distribution 
is negative and significant, thus confirming the hypothesis that both the level and the 
change towards a more equal distribution of land have an important positive effect on the 
GDP growth of a country.  
>> INSERT Table 1 << 
  A very interesting result derived from column 3 is that once we include the 
interaction term between human capital and land distribution, the configuration of the 
inequality effect on growth changes dramatically. The coefficient for land distribution is 
now positive but insignificant, the education effect becomes significant, and the interaction 
                                                 
7 Since lagged variables are used as instruments for the estimation, the equation in levels for the earliest 
period (1970) as well as the last difference equation including periods (1980-1970) cannot be estimated and 
  9term is negative and significant. This result gives support for the hypothesis that even 
though human capital investments are very important for enhancing growth, countries with 
highly unequal levels of asset distribution tend to face a reduced effectiveness of their 
educational policies. Putted in another way, we could argue that efforts for land 
redistribution should be implemented together with improvements in education in order to 
have a decisive impact on economic growth. This argument has been frequently forwarded 
in explaining the differences between land redistribution policies in Asian countries 
compared to the ones in Latin America.  
>> INSERT Table 2 << 
  Column 1 in Table 2 examines whether there is an independent effect of the asset 
distribution once we include the investment variable in the model. As we can see, the 
investment coefficient is possible and significant as expected, but the land distribution 
coefficient remains significant and negatively related to the growth rate. However, its 
magnitude has been reduced with more than 40 percent compared to the model where it 
was the only regressor included. The independent effect of land distribution remains 
negative and significant even when human capital is added to the model (column 2).  
Finally, we tested whether this apparent direct effect of inequality on growth is 
maintained once a measurement for the country’s political stability is included. Some 
authors argue that the main effect of inequality on growth is through its indirect effect on 
the security or stability of property rights. This implies that once controlling for the Rule of 
Law, the coefficient of land distribution should decrease or even turn insignificant.
8 As the 
                                                                                                                                                     
are used only as instruments. The “System GMM” estimation of eq. (2) thus includes two equations for the 
regression in levels and other two for the regression in first-differences.   
8 Using a cross-section database Keefer and Knack (2002) find that, when an index for property rights is 
added to the growth equation, the land inequality coefficient is reduced in one third, even though still negative 
and significant. 
  10index for Rule of Law that we are using is highly correlated with the level of GDP 
(correlation of 0.7) we include it alone and also as an interaction with the initial level of 
GDP for each decade. Column 3 shows that the index for Rule of Law has indeed a direct 
and positive impact on growth. While its addition to the equation turned the coefficient for 
the investment share insignificant, the direct negative impact of land distribution remains 
unaffected. The last column in Table 2 incorporates the human capital variable. Once we 
add this control the main effect is an important reduction in the coefficients for land 
distribution (from 0.07 in the previous equations to 0.056) and for the investment share 
(from 0.029 in equation 2 to 0.019), which is now again significant.   
5. Discussion   
Using for the first time a panel data set with changes in land distribution over time and 
between countries we have been able to provide confirmation for the hypothesis that asset 
distribution is a major determinant of economic growth. Apart from a direct effect we also 
show that land inequality creates a barrier to the effectiveness of educational policies. 
Moreover, our results provide support for the hypothesis that security of property rights is an 
important factor in shaping the relationship between assets inequality and growth.  
These results have two important implications for policy strategies. First, it seems 
clear that policies aiming at a more equal distribution of assets have to be combined with 
complementary measures towards educational reforms and the improvement of institutional 
arrangements to secure property rights. The lack of such a combined implementation of 
structural reforms can be one of the reasons why land reforms in several countries failed in 
the past to achieve the expected economic growth. Second, for developing countries that 
pursue market liberalization and privatization programs, it becomes of fundamental 
importance to remain alert that the effects of these reforms are not leading to the 
  11concentration of assets in few hands. Such unintended consequences are likely to 
deteriorate the country’s economic performance in the long run.         
In order to explore in more detail the conclusions derived from this study, some 
issues require further research. It would be desirable to expand the sample of countries with 
accurate information about (changes in) land distribution, so that more instruments can be 
used. Another option would be to obtain a broader measure of assets distribution (i.e. 
including housing and urban land ownership). It would also be important to find measures 
that are more directly reflecting ownership security. Many other factors - such as social 
interaction problems, political instability or ethnic heterogeneity - can be also playing a role 
but where not (yet) included in our analysis. 
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  13Region  Rule
Country 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 Law
East Asia & Pacific 
FJI  0.65  0.84 0.77 2,592 3,609 3,985 0.19 0.24 0.12  4.9  5.8 6.4 -
IDN  0.55  0.55 0.46 715 1,281 1,974 0.11 0.18 0.28  2.5  3.1 2.9 1.9
JPN  0.47  0.52 0.59 7,307 10,072 14,331 0.40 0.34 0.39  5.1  5.4 5.5 5.0
KOR  0.37  0.35 0.34 1,680 3,093 6,673 0.22 0.28 0.37  3.5  4.8 5.5 2.3
PHL  0.51  0.51 0.55 1,403 1,879 1,763 0.13 0.19 0.18  3.7  4.7 5.0 1.0
THA  0.43  0.44 0.47 1,526 2,178 3,580 0.18 0.17 0.27  3.7  3.7 4.6 3.2
East Europe & C. Asia 
TUR  0.59  0.57 0.61 2,202 2,874 3,741 0.21 0.23 0.21  2.1  2.6 3.0 2.8
Latin America 
BRA  0.84  0.85 0.85 2,434 4,303 4,042 0.20 0.22 0.15  2.5  2.3 3.1 3.9
PAN  0.80  0.84 0.87 2,584 3,392 2,888 0.26 0.22 0.16  3.5  4.5 5.7 2.0
PER  0.92  0.91 0.86 2,736 2,875 2,188 0.13 0.23 0.16  3.4  4.2 4.1 1.0
PRI  0.79  0.77 0.77 5,780 6,924 8,972 0.32 0.16 -  -  -  - -
PRY  0.86  0.93 0.93 1,394 2,534 2,128 0.09 0.21 0.18  3.4  4.0 4.4 2.0
Mid-East & N. Africa 
ISR  0.80  0.77 0.85 6,004 7,895 9,298 0.30 0.21 0.21  6.1  6.7 6.6 2.4
PRT  0.81  0.81 0.78 3,306 4,982 7,478 0.28 0.27 0.16  2.1  2.5 3.0 5.0
North America 
USA  0.72  0.72 0.74 12,963 15,295 18,054 0.20 0.20 0.20  5.8  5.9 5.8 5.8
South Asia 
IND  0.62  0.61 0.58 802 882 1,264 0.13 0.14 0.16  2.0  2.4 3.0 2.4
NPL  0.56  0.60 0.45 670 892 1,035 0.04 0.08 0.08  0.1  0.6 0.9 -
PAK  0.51  0.52 0.57 1,029 1,110 1,394 0.10 0.09 0.10  1.0  1.1 2.1 2.0
Western Europe 
AUT  0.70  0.69 0.65 7,510 10,509 12,695 0.28 0.28 0.26  3.6  3.7 3.6 6.0
BEL  0.60  0.58 0.56 8,331 11,109 13,232 0.27 0.24 0.25  6.8  5.9 6.0 6.0
CHE  0.51  0.52 0.50 12,942 14,301 16,505 0.31 0.30 0.35  5.1  5.5 5.4 5.8
CYP  0.62  0.61 0.63 3,753 5,295 8,368 0.32 0.30 0.23  4.1  4.4 5.4 2.5
DEU  0.51  0.52 0.68 9,425 11,920 14,341 0.32 0.27 0.26  3.6  3.7 3.7 -
DNK  0.43  0.46 0.44 9,670 11,342 13,909 0.30 0.22 0.21  5.5  5.5 5.5 5.9
ESP  0.84  0.85 0.86 5,861 7,390 9,583 0.28 0.24 0.29  4.1  4.0 4.2 3.8
FIN  0.25  0.23 0.26 8,108 10,851 14,059 0.40 0.35 0.33  4.9  5.1 5.5 5.8
FRA  0.53  0.53 0.53 9,200 11,756 13,904 0.31 0.27 0.27  4.2  4.1 4.2 5.1
GBR  0.69  0.68 0.67 8,537 10,167 13,217 0.20 0.16 0.19  5.8  5.9 6.0 4.6
IRL  0.49  0.49 0.48 5,015 6,823 9,274 0.27 0.27 0.23  5.0  5.2 5.4 3.9
ITA  0.75  0.76 0.78 7,568 10,323 12,488 0.31 0.27 0.25  4.1  3.7 3.8 4.9
LUX  0.45  0.47 0.48 9,782 11,893 16,280 0.32 0.26 0.32  -  -  - 6.0
NLD  0.48  0.50 0.55 9,199 11,284 13,029 0.30 0.23 0.22  5.3  5.3 5.4 6.0
NOR  0.46  0.48 0.46 8,034 12,141 14,902 0.34 0.30 0.21  5.2  5.3 6.6 6.0
Annex 1: Data base 
Land Gini GDP per capita Investment  Human capital
 
Notes: 
Land Gini: derived from FAO World Census of Agriculture (operational holdings).  
GDP per capita: Obtained from the Penn-Word Table 6.1 
Investment: Obtained from the Penn-Word Table 6.1.  
Human Capital: Taken from Barro and Lee (2000).  
Rule Law: Taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. Higher scores 
indicate “sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession 
of power”. Lower scores indicate “a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to 
settle claims”. Index between 0-6. 
  14Initial GDP (log)  -0.014 ** -0.011 -0.006 *
0.005 0.010 0.003
Land Gini  -0.121 ** -0.104 ** 0.103
0.027 0.027 0.064
Human capital (log)  0.012 0.066 **
0.014 0.025
Human cap.* Land Gini  -0.111 **
0.044
Intercept  0.222 ** 0.165 ** 0.017
0.054 0.079 0.043
countries  33 31 31
** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Std errors below coefficients.  
Initial GDP (log)  -0.006 -0.006 0.007 0.0086 
0.004 0.006 0.012 0.0152 
Land Gini  -0.070 ** -0.077 ** -0.071 ** -0.0569  *
0.026 0.021 0.024 0.0308 
Initial investment (log)  0.023 ** 0.029 ** 0.009 0.0190  *
0.010 0.008 0.007 0.0107 
Rule of Law index  0.055 ** 0.0577  **
0.019 0.0236 
Rlaw * Initial GDP  -0.006 ** -0.0064  **
0.002 0.0029 
Human capital (log)  -0.007 0.0034 
0.010 0.0113 
Intercept  0.044 0.040 -0.031 -0.0807 
0.056 0.055 0.092 0.1304 
countries  33 31 29 29 
** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Std errors below coefficients.  
Table 2: Growth regression results (land, education, investments and Rule of Law)
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) (2) (3)
Table 1:  Growth regression results (land and education)
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